Abstract. This paper focuses on the development of a principled methodology for the dependability analysis of composite Web services. The first step of the methodology involves a UML representation for the architecture specification of composite Web services. The proposed representation is built upon BPEL and introduces necessary extensions to support the second step of the methodology, which comprises the specification of properties, characterizing the failure behavior of the elements that constitute the composite Web services. The automated mapping of this extended UML model to Block Diagrams, Fault Trees and Markov models is introduced as the third step of the methodology. A comparative analysis of the aforementioned dependability analysis techniques in terms of precision and complexity is also performed.
Introduction
The Web services architecture is an emerging paradigm for the development of wide-area distributed systems. It aims at the transparent integration of Web applications, based on XML-related standards, which enable the specification of the basic services provided by the applications and the communication with those services.
Until now, quite a lot of research efforts have been made in the field of Web service composition and coordination. In particular, there exist several approaches dealing with the automated composition of Web services into composite ones [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] . Moreover, there has been work towards coordination protocols for the development of secure 3 and transactional 4 Web services. The most common approaches involve specific languages like WSFL 5 and BPEL 6 that can be employed in order to regulate the workflow-like execution, or orchestration of composite Web services. This paper is placed into a different context, involving the development of a principled methodology for the dependability analysis of composite Web services. A composite Web service is dependable if it is trustworthy. By definition [7] , dependability is a quite wide concept, which is characterized by a number of attributes including reliability, availability, safety, security, etc.. The basic impairments to the aforementioned properties are faults, causing errors in the state of the service. Errors are perceived by the users of the service as failures, i.e., deviations of the delivered service from its standard specification.
For some of the dependability attributes (namely for reliability, availability and safety) there exist probability-based theoretic foundations, enabling the dependability analysis. The goal of the analysis is to estimate -predict the values of these dependability attributes, based on properties (e.g., failure rate, redundancy, etc.) that characterize the constituents of a composite Web service. Reliability analysis, for instance, aims at estimating the probability that the composite service is correctly provided for a particular time period. Traditional dependability analysis techniques include techniques that rely on the specification of constraints, describing what is needed to guarantee correct service provisioning (e.g., Block-Diagrams (BDs) and Fault-Trees (FTs)) [8] . Sophisticated approaches include techniques based on the specification of Markov models that precisely describe the failure behavior of the elements that constitute the service [9, 10] . In general, the use of traditional dependability analysis techniques is a tedious task, which requires significant time and modelling expertise [11] .
Within this context, this paper deals with the following problem: "Given the specification of a composite Web service in a suitable language like BPEL, how can we assess its dependability attributes (esp. its reliability)?". The input to the problem is the specification of the composite Web service in BPEL. The output is a set of measures, explaining how the composite Web service is characterized in terms of its dependability attributes. The steps to follow towards this end can be summarized as follows:
1. Map BPEL specifications to UML models. BPEL is a language that follows the XML paradigm. Being such, it is fully suitable for automated parsing and processing, but, too hard to read and write for human beings. Due to the complexity of the overall task of the dependability analysis, it is thus quite helpful to map the BPEL constructs to some easy-to-read notation, hopefully graphical, which can act as the blueprint of the overall scenario. UML 7 can obviously play this role, being a widely accepted, state-of-theart, graphical design language. Therefore, our first contribution involves a principled method to map BPEL constructs to UML elements and derive the respective UML models for composite Web service scenarios. The proposed mapping can work the other way around: a designer wishing to describe a composite Web service can start with the respective UML model (which is easy to construct) and then map it to its corresponding BPEL specification. 2. Extend the UML diagram with properties for dependability analysis. Such properties (e.g. failure rate, redundancy) describe the failure behavior of the constituents of the composite Web service. Therefore, our second contribution involves the proposal of a set of tagged values for the UML elements that we introduce, specifically intended for dependability analysis. Then, the UML model has to be annotated with these values, before proceeding to the evaluation of the dependability attributes of the composite Web service. 3. Use the annotated model as input to traditional dependability analysis techniques. Our third contribution consists of the automated generation of Block Diagrams, Fault-Trees and Markov models, serving to the assessment of the dependability attributes of the composite Web service. We follow a principled approach for all the three aforementioned techniques. The case of Block Diagrams and Fault Trees is rather straightforward, due to their inherent simplicity. Markov models, on the other hand, involve more complicated modeling through a quite voluminous set of transitions from erroneous to correct states.
In the rest of this paper we focus on the reliability attribute. Availability and safety can be handled similarly. The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present the two first steps of the methodology. The third step is covered in two sections: in Section 3 we deal with Block Diagrams and Fault trees and in Section 4, we cover the case of Markov models. Section 5 presents the overall assessment of these techniques in terms of precision and complexity. Finally, Section 6 discusses related work and Section 7 concludes our results and discusses issues for future research.
UML for the Dependability Analysis of Web Services
The proposed UML representation comprises the definitions of a set of stereotypes detailed in Section 2.1. These stereotypes enhance the semantics of standard types of UML meta-model elements (i.e., the base classes of the stereotypes) so as to model standard BPEL elements. The stereotypes are further associated with additional properties detailed in Section 2.2, which characterize the failure behavior of the BPEL elements. Table 1 summarizes the definitions of the proposed stereotypes 8 . A composite service in BPEL is described in terms of a process specified using a homonymous stereotype. A process consists of activities, specified using the activity stereotype. The execution of an activity relies on Web services, provided by one or more partners, modelled in terms of the partnerLink stereotype.
UML stereotypes for composite Web services
The process specification further includes the description of fault and event handlers (specified using the faultHandler and the eventHandler stereotypes). A fault handler includes an activity, triggered upon the occurrence of a failure. Note here that failures that are properly handled do not cause the failure of the overall business process. Hence, in the dependability analysis, we only consider faults for which there exist no fault handlers. An event handler is an activity that executes upon the reception of a particular message. Our representation allows specifying different kinds of basic (see Figure 1 (a)) and structured (see Figure 1(b) ) BPEL activities. The execution of a basic activity relies on a single Web service. On the other hand, a structured activity consists of a set of (basic or structured) activities and prescribes the order of their execution. In other words, it defines a number of control and data flow dependencies. These dependencies are specified in UML using UML ControlFlow elements (i.e., arrows stating that the target activity is triggered when the execution of the source activity is done) and UML DataFlow elements (i.e., arrows stating that the target activity accepts input from the source activity).
By definition, every basic activity is associated with a joinCondition element, i.e., a predicate logic formula, describing requirements on one or more flow dependencies, specified for the activity. A join condition may specify, for instance, that an activity α, depends on both the activities β and γ. Another join condition may specify that an activity δ depends on activities or ζ. The different kinds of basic activities supported by our representation are:
-invoke activities, specifying the synchronous, or asynchronous invocation of a Web service. -receive activities, describing the reception of request messages that initiate a process. A receive activity must be an initial activity of the process; any other activities that precede it, or execute simultaneously must also be receive activities. -reply activities, delineating responses to request messages that were previously received during the execution of receive activities.
The different kinds of structured activities supported by our representation are:
-sequence activities, consisting of activities that execute sequentially.
-switch activities, consisting of ordered activities associated with conditions. During a switch activity, only the first activity whose condition evaluates to true actually executes. -while activities, comprising a single activity that executes more that once.
-pick activities, consisting of one or more event handlers.
-flow activities, comprising one or more activities, which by default execute concurrently. However, there may exist control and data flow dependencies between them, imposing a certain execution order.
Failure behavior properties
The basic properties, characterizing the stereotypes defined in Section 2.1 are given in Table 2 . In particular, the process stereotype is associated with measures, which correspond to the basic dependability attributes. The reliability measure we use is the probability that a composite Web service executes correctly for a given time period. Similarly, the availability measure we consider is the probability that the composite service executes correctly at a given moment in time. As a safety measure we assume the probability that there will be no catastrophic failures for a given time period.
The impairments to the aforementioned measures are the faults and the failures of the partners that provide the Web services used in the activities of the composite Web service. Faults appear with a certain rate specified using the failure-rate property given in Table 2 . Moreover, the partnerLink stereotype is associated with properties that allow distinguishing between different kinds of faults and failures. A list of such properties given in Table 2 (detailed definitions can be found in [7] ) and includes the nature, the boundaries, the phase of creation and the persistence of faults. With respect to the aforementioned properties we distinguish between:
-Permanent faults i.e., faults that are present for the lifetime of a partner.
The presence of these faults does not depend on the internal condition of the partner, neither on the external interaction of the partner with the environment. -Temporary faults, i.e., faults that are present for a limited time period. Temporary faults are further divided in: 1. Transient faults, i.e., temporary external faults, resulting from the interaction of the partner with the environment. Transient faults disappear with a certain rate (specified using the disappearance-rate property, given in Table 2 ). 2. Intermittent faults, i.e., temporary internal faults, resulting from the interference between the different parts of the partner. Intermittent faults may be either active or benign. In the former case, the failed partner provides incorrect services, while in the latter the previous does not hold. Intermittent faults repeatedly go from active to benign and back to active with certain rates (specified using the active-to-benign-rate and the benign-to-active-rate properties defined in Table 2 ).
Note here that the faults and the failures of the underlying middleware infrastructure used for implementing Web services may also be considered as impairments to the dependability of composite Web services [12] . Dealing with the aforementioned is out of the scope of this paper. However, it would imply associating the stereotypes we defined for basic and structured activities with properties that are similar with the ones defined for the partnerLink stereotype.
The partnerLink stereotype is further associated with properties [13] , characterizing the fault tolerance technique that may be used in a partner. More specifically, a partner may represent a redundancy schema, i.e., a composite partner that encapsulates a configuration of redundant partners, which behave as a single fault tolerant unit. This schema is characterized by the error detection mechanism used, the number of partners (no partners ) that constitute it, the number of partner failures that can be tolerated (no f ailures ), etc.
For the dependability analysis of composite Web services we must further account for the completion-rate of basic activities. The completion rate of structured activities is a function of the completion rates of the basic activities that constitute them (we assume here that there is no additional overhead introduced by structured activities for the coordination of their constituents). For the particular case of while activities a property of type integer, named no-iter, is associated with the corresponding stereotype. The values of this property represent the approximate number of iterations performed by the while activities. Finally, for the case of switch (resp. pick ) activities with N branches we assume a corresponding array of N probabilities, named branch-prob, as a property of the switch stereotype.
In order to motivate the discussion, in this section we introduce two reference examples of composite Web services, chosen out of the BPEL standard specification. The first example is given in Figure 2 , using the stereotypes we defined in this section. It involves a composite service provided by a shipping company. The service is orchestrated as follows:
1. The rcvCustomer activity, receives orders from customers, represented by the customer partner. An order consists of a set of items. 2. Then, the service offers two alternative types of delivery (switch activity):
-all of the items are held and delivered together (a single invoke activity, named invCustomer );
-the items are shipped piecemeal (a while activity that repeatedly executes an invoke activity, named whInvCustomer, for each item). Our second example is given in Figure 3 and involves a loan approval service. The composite service is orchestrated as follows:
1. The rcvCustomer activity receives a loan request by a customer. 2. Then, a service provided by an assessor partner is invoked within the invAssessor activity to assess the loan request. This invocation results in a report, which is given as input to the approver partner, through the invApprover activity. 3. The approver then makes a final decision. The decision is sent back to the customer as a reply to his/her loan request through the rplCustomer activity.
Automated Transformation of UML diagrams to Block Diagrams and Fault Trees
In this section, we discuss Block Diagrams and Fault Trees and the mapping of UML models to these modelling techniques.
We use a BD to represent graphically a constraint for correctly providing a composite Web service. Hereafter, we call such a constraint, constraint-tosucceed. Roughly, the BD consists of blocks (i.e., boxes), representing the partners that provide the basic Web services, which are executed in the activities of the composite Web service. Those blocks are connected using serial connections. Depending on the different kinds of activities that constitute the composite Web service we build the BD as follows: 1. For every sequence, flow or while activity A, consisting of the α 1 , α 2 , . . . α N constituent activities, all of them are needed to successfully complete A (for while activities N = 1). 2. For every switch or pick activity A with N branches we have N constituent activities α 1 , α 2 , . . . α N . Any of them may execute, depending on the switch condition or the particular events that occur at runtime. Hence, all the constituent activities are needed with a certain probability branch − prob αi , i = 1, . . . N to successfully complete A. 3. Given the above, for every basic activity
. . p K be the non-fault-tolerant partners that provide basic Web services used in α 1 , α 2 , . . . α L . We create a new block for every such partner. The blocks are connected with serial connections. Moreover, the corresponding constraint to succeed is:
. . p M be the fault tolerant partners that provide basic Web services used in α 1 , α 2 , . . . α L . We create a new i out-of no partners parallel connection for every p l , K + 1 < l < M , where i = no partners − no f ailures (see Section 2.2 for the semantics of no partners and no f ailures ) In the case where no f ailures = no partners − 1, the corresponding constraint to succeed is:
Based on the BD built for the composite Web service we calculate the values of service's dependability measures through simple combinatorial calculations, involving the dependability measures of the individual partners used in the BD (possibly multiplied by certain branch probabilities if the partners are used within pick or switch activities). Taking an example, the provision of the loan approval service for a time period t requires using three partners: the customer, the assessor and the approver. The corresponding constraint-to-succeed is:
Success loan−approval ≡ customer ∧ assessor ∧ approver The BD that graphically represents the constraint-to-succeed is shown in Figure 4(a) . For the case of the reliability attribute, the value of the corresponding measure is the probability that Success loan−approval holds for the time period t. This value is obtained through simple combinatorial calculations involving the reliability measures, R customer , R assessor , R approver , of the partners as follows:
Every partner is characterized by a failure-rate, λ (see Table 2 in Section 2.2). In computer systems it is typical to assume that the probability that a system fails at a time T < t is exponentially distributed [10] . Given that the partners of a composite service are, in principle, autonomous systems, we can assume that their probability of failure is also exponentially distributed. Then, for the customer, the assessor and the approver we have:
Consequently, the reliability for each partner is :
Let us assume now that the approver is a redundancy schema that consists of two redundant elements and tolerates one failure. The constraint-to-succeed for this case is:
The corresponding BD is given in Figure 4 (b). The approver is represented by a 1 out-of 2 parallel connection, which is connected in serial with the assessor. The overall reliability is the probability that Success loan−approval holds:
In BDs, we calculate the values of the dependability measures of a composite service, based on the values of the dependability measures that characterize the partners involved in this service. Alternatively, we can calculate the dependability measures based on the probabilities of failure. To achieve this, we have to first specify how the failures of partners affect the failure of the overall service. This can be done using an FT [8] . In general, an FT visualizes a constraint that describes undesired events that lead to a top-level undesired event. Hereafter, we call such a constraint, constraint-to-fail. FTs can be built automatically from UML models using a procedure that is quite similar with the one for BDs. For that reason, we provide no further details. However, we demonstrate the use of FTs using the example of the loan approval service. In particular, the failure of any of the three partners that participate in the service leads to the failure of the overall service. Hence, our constraint-to-fail is:
F ailure loan−approval ≡ F ailure customer ∨ F ailure assessor ∨ F ailure approver Figure 5 (a), gives the FT that represents graphically this constraint. The failures of the individual partners (i.e., the undesired events) are connected to the inputs of an OR gate, whose output is the failure of the loan approval service (i.e., the top-level event). Then, the probability of the service failure is:
If we assume again that the approver is a redundancy schema then, the constraint-to-fail is:
In this case, the corresponding FT is given in Figure 5 (b). In particular, the failure of the approver is substituted by an AND gate, whose inputs are connected to the failures of the redundant partners. The output of the AND gate represents the failure of the overall redundancy schema. The failure probability in this case is calculated based on the following formula:
In principle, FTs and BDs are equivalent (a BD we can easily transformed into an FT and the inverse). Furthermore, they are quite easy to specify and they are not computationally intensive. On the other hand, their main drawback is that they do not allow modelling dynamic aspects of the execution of a composite Web service that affect the values of the dependability measures. For example, a partner failure caused by a permanent fault may not affect the execution of a composite Web service, if all of the activities that depend on this partner are completed before the occurrence of that failure. Moreover, a partner failure that is caused by a transient fault may not affect the execution of the composite service if the fault disappears before the beginning of the activities that depend on this partner. Similarly, a partner failure that is caused by an intermittent fault may not have any impact on the execution of the composite service if the fault goes: (1) benign, before the beginning of the activities that depend on this partner and (2) active after the end of those activities. In general, temporary faults are very typical over the Web. Consequently, the need to account for such cases, during the dependability analysis of a Web service is very important. In other words, it is important to model with greater precision the failure behavior of a composite Web service and this can be achieved using a Markov-based technique [10, 9] .
Automated Transformation of UML diagrams to Markov Models
Block Diagrams and Fault Trees are very simple modeling techniques with the advantage of being easy to construct and quick to compute. Nevertheless, we can do better in terms of precision of our analysis by employing Markov models. In this section, we present Markov models as a general technique for the dependability analysis of composite systems. Then, we focus on our specific problem that involves composite Web services and based on the difficulty of specifying certain parts of a Markov model, we offer automated techniques for this tasks.
Markov Models
A Markov model for a composite Web service consists of a set of transitions between states of the service. A state describes a situation where either the service is correctly provided, or not. In the latter case, we say that the composite Web service is in a death-state. The state of the service depends on the situation of the basic activities (which may be encapsulated in structured activities or not) and the situation of the partners that constitute it. The structured activities that encapsulate basic activities do not affect the situation of a composite service as they are not involved in performing any serious computation. They mainly serve as a structuring mechanism, which further determines the execution order of certain encapsulated activities. All the necessary computation for achieving the composite Web service is performed by the services that are invoked within the basic activities that constitute the structured ones. Hence, a state can be seen as a composition of sub-states, representing the partners and the basic activities of a composite service. A basic activity may be in 4 different states: inactive, active, complete, or failed. The range of the different state situations for a partner depends on the kind of faults that exist for this partner. A partner with a permanent, or a transient fault may be: operational, or failed. Similarly, a partner with an intermittent fault may be: operational, failed-active, or failedbenign. The range of the different state situations for partners that represent redundancy schemas further depends on the number of redundant partners and the number of failures that can be tolerated. For example, for a redundancy schema with 2 partners, tolerating 1 failure caused by a permanent, or a transient fault we have three possible situations: both partners operational, 1 partner failed, both partners failed.
Taking an example, suppose that the customer partner involved in providing the shipping service may fail because of a transient fault. Then, the corresponding Markov model that describes the failure behavior of the service comprises 11 states and 16 transitions, which are given in Table 3 (the format used to present the Markov model is the one assumed by the SURE reliability analysis tool [10] , which we use for solving Markov models as detailed in the following subsection). The state of the shipping service is modelled by a tuple of 4 integer values representing the sub-states that correspond to the customer, the rcvCustomer activity, the invCustomer activity, and to the whInvCustomer activity. The first value of the tuple is 0 in states where the customer is operational and 1 in states where the customer is failed. For the rcvCustomer and the invCustomer activities the values may be 0, 1, 2, or 3, in states where the activities are inactive, active, complete, or failed, respectively. The whInvCustomer activity is actually encapsulated in a while activity. If we assume that the approximate number of iterations is 2, then the integer value that corresponds to the whInvCustomer activity may be 0, 1, 2, 3, or 4, depending on whether the activity is inactive, active-1st-iteration, active-2nd-iteration, complete, or failed, respectively.
In general, a Markov model for composite Web services comprises the following different kinds of transitions:
-Transitions for partner failures, which take the service from a state where the partner is operational, to a state where the partner is failed (e.g., transition 2 in Table 3 ). These transitions are characterized by the failure-rate, or the benign-to-active-rate of the partner (see Table 2 ). -Transitions for partner recovery, taking the service from a state where the partner is failed, to a state where the partner is operational (e.g., transition 5 in Table 3 ). These transitions are characterized by the disappearance-rate, or the active-to-benign-rate of the partner (see Table 2 ). -Transitions for activity activation, which take the service from a state where the activity is inactive, to a state where the activity is active (e.g., transition 1 in Table 3 ). These transitions take place only if the preceding activities are complete (i.e., the join condition of the activity holds) and the partner used by the activity is not failed. -Transitions for activity completion, taking the service from a state where the activity is active, to a state where the activity is complete (e.g., transition 3 in Table 3 ). These transitions are characterized by the completion-rate of the activity (see Table 2 ). -Transitions for activity failure, taking the service from a state where the activity is active, to a state where the activity is failed due to the failure of a partner used by the activity (e.g., transition 4 in Table 3 ). These transitions are characterized by the failure-rate, or the benign-to-active-rate of the partner (see Table 2 ).
The value of the reliability measure equals to the probability of reaching a death-state of the Markov model within a given time period t. The calculation of this value involves solving a system of first-order differential equations [10] . Table 3 . Markov model for the shipping Web service.
failure-rate = 10e-3; disappearance-rate = 0.5; trig-rate = 1; completion-rate =0.05; branch-prob = 0.069; Transition SOURCE TARGET RATE  ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
The general framework for the automated generation of Markov models
Generally, it is recognized that the specification of Markov models is a complex and error-prone task [11] . To deal with this problem Johnson [11] proposed an algorithm that relies on the concepts discussed in the previous subsection. In particular, states are modelled as tuples of integer values, representing elements that provide basic services. Examples of such tuples are given in Table 3 . The algorithm generates Markov models, given the following input: where a particular partner π is operational). From all these source states there should be transitions to target states, which also share common features (e.g., π is failed in all target states). Moreover, the transitions to the target states are characterized by a common rate (e.g., the failure-rate that characterizes π). The transition statement of the rule specifies this common rate and the common features shared amongst the set of the target states.
Given the above, the algorithm starts from the initial Markov state and recursively applies the transition rules, as long as, their conditional statements hold for this state. During a recursive step and for a particular transition rule, the algorithm produces a transition to a state derived from the initial one. If the death-state constraint holds for the resulting target state, the recursion stops. That way the algorithm automatically produces all the possible state transitions for the Markov model.
Taking the example we used in the previous subsection we have that the state range definition for the shipping Web service is: The above rule refers to a set of source states whose common features are the following:
-The customer is operational (customer = 0). -The single invocation activity is active (invCustomer = 1).
According to the transition statement of the rule, for every source state, there exists a transition to a target state and the common features of all target states are:
-The customer is failed (customer = 1).
-The single invocation activity is failed because of the customer failure (invCustomer = 3).
The rate that characterizes all of the transitions prescribed by the above rule is 0.0001; it is the failure-rate that characterizes the fault, which caused the failure of the customer. Still, however, the specification of the transition rules is a complicated and error-prone task, especially for the case of complex, composite Web services. To completely alleviate the problem of specifying complex Markov models for the dependability analysis of composite Web services we propose an automated procedure that generates input models for Johnson's algorithm, from UML models of composite Web services. The generated models are then given as input to the ASSIST tool [14] , which implements Johnson's algorithm and generates a complete Markov model. Finally, the Markov model may be given as input to tools like the SURE reliability analysis tool [10] , which solve Markov models and calculate the values of dependability measures.
Generating state-range definitions
The generation of a state range definition from the architectural description of a composite Web service relies on the following steps.
-First, we select all the partnerLink elements used in the specification of the process that describes the architecture of the composite service. Each one of them represents a partner and a corresponding variable is created in the state-range definition. The range of the integer values for this variable depends on the fault and the failure properties that are associated with the partnerLink element. More specifically we have:
• For a partner π with permanent, or transient faults the value of the variable is 0 in states where π is operational and 1 in states where π is failed.
• For a partner π with intermittent faults the value of the variable is 0 in states where π is operational, 1 in states where π is failed and the fault is active and 2 in states where π is failed and the fault is benign. Moreover, the range of the integer values depends on the redundancy properties that are associated with the partnerLink element.
-Following, we select all the basic activities (invoke, receive, and reply activities) that are specified in the process (as in previous cases, some of them may be encapsulated into more complex structured activities). For each activity α, we also create a variable in the state-range definition. More specifically:
• If α is encapsulated in a while structured activity that performs approximately no-iter iterations, the variable takes values from 0 to no-iter +1. The semantics of these values are given in Table 4 .
• Otherwise the variable takes values from 0 to 3. The semantics of these values are summarized in Table 5 . Table 4 . Range of state-range variables for activities, are embedded in while activities.
Value Semantics 0 α is inactive. i : 1, . . ., no-iter -1 α is executed for the i th time. no-iter α is complete. no-iter +1 α is failed due to the failure of the partner used by this activity. Table 5 . Range of state-range variables for activities that are not embedded in while activities.
Value Semantics
α is failed due to the failure of the partner used by this activity.
Based on the previous steps, the state-range definition for the loan approval service is: 
Generating death-state constraints
A process is considered as failed in states where any of the activities that constitute it is failed. Hence, to generate a death-state constraint, we select from a process all the activities. Based on the selected activities, we build the deathstate constraint, which is the disjunction of a number of boolean expressions. Each expression involves a state-range variable that represents one of the activities, say α. If α is encapsulated in a while activity that performs no-iter iteration, the expression evaluates to true if the variable equals to no-iter +1 (see Table 4 ). In all other cases the expression evaluates to true if the variable equals to 3 (see Table 5 ).
Following the aforementioned steps for the loan approval service gives us the death-state constraint described below: deathif (rcvCustomer = 3 ∨ invAssessor = 3∨ invApprover = 3 ∨ rplCustomer = 3);
Generating transition rules
The generation of transition rules from the UML model of a composite service is slightly more complicated. In Section 4.1 we identified 4 different categories of transitions. Consequently, here we distinguish between 4 different categories of transition rules.
-Transition rules for partner failures: for every partner specified in the process that describes the composite Web service, we generate a rule whose conditional statement holds for all source states where the partner is operational and there are no active activities. The rule prescribes that for these source states there should be transitions to target states, whose common feature is that the partner is failed. The rate for these transitions is the failure-rate, or the benign-to-active-rate of the partner. Following, we give an example of a rule for the approver partner of the loan approval service:
if approver = 0 ∧ invApprover = 1 then tranto ( customer, approver + 1, rcvCustomer, invApprover, rplCustomer ) by failure-rate; endif;
-Transition rules for partner recovery: for every partner that may fail because of temporary faults (i.e., transient, or intermittent faults) we generate a corresponding transition rule. The conditional statement of this rule holds for states where the partner is failed. On the other hand, the transition statement depends on the kind of the fault that may occur for the partner. For transient faults, in particular, the transition statement specifies transitions to target states, whose common feature is that the partner is operational again. The rate for these transitions is the disappearance-rate that is associated with the partner. For intermittent faults, the transition statement prescribes transitions to target states, whose common feature is that the partner is still failed, but the fault is not active. The rate for these transitions is the active-to-benign-rate that is associated with the partner. Below, we give an example of a rule that is generated for the approver partner of the loan approval service, if we suppose that the approver may fail because of a transient fault.
if approver = 1 then tranto (approver = 0) by disappearance-rate; endif; -Transition rules for activity activation: for every basic activity α of the process we generate a transition rule, whose conditional statement holds for states where: 1. The activity is inactive. 2. The activities upon which α depends are complete (i.e., the join condition of α holds).
3. The partner, used in α is operational. Hence, to build the conditional statement we rely on the dataflow and control dependencies that are specified for α and the join condition that is associated with it. The transition statement of the rule states that for all source states there should be transitions to target states, whose common feature is that α is active. If α is embedded in a pick or a switch activity, the transitions are characterized by the branch-prob of the corresponding branch. Otherwise, they are characterized by a default rate. If α is encapsulated in a flow activity together with activities β, γ, . . . and the join condition for all of them is the same, then the conditional and the transition statements of the rule involve all these activities, which are finally concurrently activated. Below, we give an example of a rule for the activation of the invApprover activity that uses the approver partner and depends on the completion of the invAssessor activity.
if invApprover = 0 ∧ invAssessor = 2 ∧ approver = 0 then tranto (invApprover = 1) by trig-rate; endif;
-Transition rules for activity completion: for every basic activity α we further generate a transition rule, whose conditional statement holds for states where: 1. α is active. 2. The partner that is used in α is operational.
Regarding the transition statement of the rule we have:
• If α is encapsulated in a while activity, then the transition statement prescribes transitions to target states whose common feature is that α is reactivated. These transitions actually model the fact that in the source state α executes within the i th iteration of the while activity, while in the target state it executes within the i th + 1 iteration of the while activity • Otherwise, the transition statement specifies transitions to target states, whose common feature is that α is complete. The transitions described by the aforementioned rule are characterized by the completion-rate of α. Following, we give an example of a rule for the completion of the invApprover activity that uses the approver partner.
if invApprover = 1 ∧ approver = 0 then tranto (invApprover + +) by completion-rate; endif; -Transition rules for activity failure: for every basic activity α we generate a transition rule, whose conditional statement holds for states where: 1. α is active. 2. The partner that is used in α is operational. The transition statement of the rule states that there should be transitions from the aforementioned states to target states, whose common feature is that the partner is failed. In the target states, α is also considered as failed due to the failure of the partner. The rate for these transitions is the failurerate, or the benign-to-active-rate of the partner. Following, we give an example of a rule for the approver partner of the loan approval service:
if approver = 0 ∧ invApprover = 1 then tranto (customer, assessor, approver + 1, rcvCustomer, invAssessor, invApprover + 2, rplCustomer) by failure-rate; endif;
Assessment
To assess the overall methodology proposed in this paper, we experiment using the composite Web services we used throughout the paper. In particular, we assess the advantages and the disadvantages of BDs and Markov models regarding their precision and their complexity in the context of Web services.
In terms of our motivating examples, we assume the following setup for our experiments. The customer in the shipping service fails due to a transient fault. The approver partner in the loan approval service also fails due to a transient fault. The rest of the partners in the loan approval service fail because of permanent faults. For all kinds of faults we consider a range of failure-rates from 10 −10 to 10 −3 . Transient faults have a disappearance rate of 0.5. We also assume an average number of 2 iterations for the while activity of the shipping service and a uniform probability for the branches of the switch activity.
Following, we generated the BDs and the Markov models for the composite services. Based on the Markov models we used the SURE tool to calculate the values of the reliability measure for the services, for each different failure-rate and for a period t of 10 time-units. Similarly, we calculated corresponding values of the reliability measure using the BDs.
Figures 6 (a) and (b) show the results we got for the shipping and the loan approval services, respectively. More specifically, we observe that the reliability values that were calculated using the BDs are smaller compared to the ones calculated using the Markov models. The percentage of the difference between the two dependability analysis techniques increases as we increase the failure rates (see Figure 6 (c)). As expected from the discussion in Section 4 the BDbased technique underestimates the reliability of the services because it does not take into account that the transient faults of partners may disappear before the activation of the activities that use those partners. In these cases, the transient faults do not affect the correct execution of the composite services. This fact is captured in the Markov models, which specify more precisely the failure behavior of the elements that constitute the composite Web services.
Based on the above, it is safe to argue that, as originally expected, the Markov-based technique is more precise for analyzing the dependability of composite Web services. However, as we discussed in Section 4, the most serious argument against its use is that the specification of Markov models is a complex task. Assume that a metric for the complexity of a Markov model, C markov , is the number of transitions rules required as input to Johnson's algorithm [11] . Moreover, assume that the complexity of a BD, C BD is simply the number of blocks that constitute it. Then, for a composite Web service that consists of N partners with permanent faults, M partners with temporary faults and K activities, we have: For the specific case of the Web services we use in this paper we have the values given in Figure 6(d) . Moreover, BDs are quite faster to compute due to their simplicity. Figure 6 (e) shows the execution times for calculating the values of reliability for the services, given the generated BDs and Markov models. The previous, generally, highlight the significance of principled methodologies for the automated transformation of Web service architectural specifications, into traditional models (Markov models, queueing networks, Petri-nets, etc.) for the quality analysis of non-functional properties. Another important aspect that advocates the previous argument without being highlighted by the numbers shown in Figure 6 is that these methodologies encapsulate the modelling expertise of domain experts, which is not necessarily part of the knowledge of everyday's developers.
Related Work
We explored the issue of dependability analysis for conventional composite systems in the past [15, 16] . There are both similarities and differences with this line of research. On the common side, we share the methodological approach to the problem (i.e., given a certain input, we map it to UML -for ease of modelling -and then we transform the UML diagram to a well known dependability analysis technique). On the other hand, there are prominent differences, specifically tailored for the case of Web Services: both the input (BPEL in our case) and the automated derivation of the dependability analysis models are different. The lesson here is that although one does not need to reinvent the wheel in terms of fundamental techniques (but rather, follow a principled methodology), there are still specific issues to address, which we handle in this paper.
In the context of composite Web services, the issues of quality specification, analysis and management just begin to gain the attention of various research communities. More specifically, in [17] the authors propose a framework for the provision of differentiated levels of service that meet the customers' functional and quality requirements, which are described in terms of Service Level Agreements (SLAs). SLAs are specified using a declarative language, named WSLA. SLAng is also a language for the specification of SLAs [18] . While these approaches are quite generic, we specifically focus on dependability properties and dependability analysis techniques for composite Web services. The dependability properties can be seen as SLA attributes. Then, the models can be used to further generate WSLA or SLAng specifications. In [19] the authors also propose an infrastructure-based solution for the provision of differentiated levels of service. They particularly deal with performance SLA attributes. Similarly, in [20] the authors tackle the problem of locating Web services in Ad-Hoc networks based on a set of quality criteria. In order to achieve the previous they define a total benefit function. The quality criteria they consider include the reliability attribute. Regarding this attribute, the approach proposed in this paper goes one step further as it enables the systematic analysis of the impact of more than one Web services in the overall reliability of a composite Web service that encapsulates them. In [21] the authors deal with a similar problem. More specifically, in this approach the input is the specification of a composite Web service that combines N primitive Web services. Moreover the authors assume the existence of N sets of compatible primitive Web services characterized by a number of quality attributes like reliability, performance, price, reputation, etc. Then, they propose an analysis method that allows selecting N services out of the N sets, which can be used in the composite Web service to achieve optimal quality. Although the proposed approach is interesting, the part of the analysis that concerns reliability is primitive and can be enhanced based on the principled methodology we propose in this paper.
Conclusions
In this paper we investigated the dependability analysis of composite services. More specifically, we concentrated on a principled methodology for achieving the previous. Our basic contributions are:
-A UML-based representation for the architecture specification of composite Web services. The proposed representation is built upon BPEL and introduces necessary extensions to support the specification of properties that characterize the failure behavior of the elements that constitute the composite Web services. -The automated mapping of UML models that rely on the aforementioned representation to Block Diagrams, Fault Trees and Markov models, which enable the subsequent estimation of the reliability measures of the composite Web services.
In this paper we further performed a comparative analysis of the BDs and Markov models with respect to their precision and complexity. This analysis revealed the benefits of the proposed methodology.
However, throughout this paper we considered that the end-users of our approach are the designers of composite Web services, who statically perform the analysis at design-time. An interesting topic for future research is that of building a quality analysis Web service that actually performs this task for the designers, on-the-fly, by monitoring a set of available Web services; such functionality can be either part of a UDDI implementation, or part of a middleware infrastructure that supports the development of composite Web services. In the latter case, the complexity of the analysis techniques plays a even more important role, especially if the infrastructure is targeted to the development of Web services in pervasive computing environments [22] .
